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This paper analyzes the relationship between the terms on bank loans and local crime rates, 
employing a sample of over 300,000 bank-firm relationships. Controlling for firm, market and 
bank characteristics the results show that where the crime rate is higher borrowers pay higher 
interest rates, pledge more collateral, and resort less to asset-backed loans and more to revolving 
credit lines than borrowers in low-crime areas. The evidence also suggests that access to credit is 
adversely affected by crime. The offenses that affect the loan market are those that exogenously 
increase firm fragility (extortion, organized crime) and raise loss given default (fraud, fraudulent 
bankruptcy). 
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∗  Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department.    1. Introduction
1
The economic literature widely recognizes that poor governance and weak institutions have 
substantial repercussions on economic growth. The rent-seeking activities that flourish in the 
absence of effective protection of property rights can worsen a country’s economic performance 
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, (1993)). 
The recent availability of measures of governance, quality of institutions and 
corruption has stimulated a growing body of empirical work on the effect of these factors 
on economic and financial variables (e.g. Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007), Keefer and Knack (1995); and Mauro (1995)). The 
general conclusion is that the economic impact of  governance is large. Institutional quality 
is the most important factor explaining cross-country differences in income levels, physical 
capital accumulation and factor productivity (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004)). 
There are many potential channels through which governance influences the 
decisions of economic agents and, consequently, investment and growth. One is that 
economic agents may have incentives to invest less because they fear expropriation of 
returns (Besley eand Coate (1995); Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, (2002)).  In high 
crime countries, potential entrepreneurs have to face the risk of losses due to expropriation 
and additional costs for security and protection. 
Evidence from survey data (World Bank 2005) shows that security and protection 
costs can amount to as much as 23 percent, and that losses due to crime are around 4.6 
percent. The proportion of firms identifying crime, theft and disorder as major or severe 
obstacles to business operation and growth ranges from 17 percent in Europe and Central 
Asia to more than 50 percent in Latin American and the Caribbean. Even within developed 
countries crime can seriously affect the urban population and have indirect consequences 
on local economic conditions (Cullen and Levitt (1999)). 
One sector of the economy where weak governance is likely to have a major impact 
is the bank credit market. Given the importance of credit availability for investment, 
inefficiencies in the banking sector are likely to have repercussions on growth. A first, 
direct, effect of crime on credit supply conditions is that on the costs of operating a bank. 
In high-crime areas banks will have to spend more on security and protection. Because 
they manage cash, banks face a higher risk of robbery than other businesses. When the 
higher costs of counter-measures are passed on to borrowers and consumers, crime reduces 
the equilibrium demand for banking services. 
A second effect of crime is that in high-crime areas the quality of borrowers is more 
difficult to assess. Not only are borrowers are more fragile, but the signals that banks 
typically use to evaluate credit risk provide less information. In a world with asymmetric 
information, banks may be less willing to lend in high-crime areas because they cannot 
fully incorporate the higher default risk in the interest rate. Hold-up and moral hazard 
––––– 
1  The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy or its staff. I thank for their suggestions Ugo Albertazzi, 
Nicola Coniglio, Antonio Falato and participants at the 2008 FIRS Conference in Anchorage and the Bank of Italy workshop in 
Perugia (February 2009). For comments on an earlier version, I also thank participants in the Micro Brown Bag Seminar at the 
Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago, and in the Offshore and Underground Finance Conference (October 2007) 
at Bocconi University. 
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problems could be worse in high crime areas if borrowers are more opaque because they 
have to hide payments for protection. If asymmetric information problems are severe and 
risk levels very high, there could be substantial credit rationing, especially if the banks do 
not know the local market very well. Demirguc Kunt and Maximovic (2005) find that 
intuitive descriptors of an efficient legal system, for example the efficiency of the court 
system, play a minor role in affecting firm growth, whereas corruption matters especially 
for small firms that are more financially constrained. 
Finally, uncertainty about the future behavior of the parties involved is one of the key 
characteristics of financial transactions. A high incidence of fraud is likely to reduce the 
propensity of potential lenders to grant a loan not backed by collateral, because of the 
lower expected return. Empirical evidence shows that trust affects the degree of financial 
development and the mix of financial instruments that a community uses (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2004)). 
Based on data on Italian provinces, this study explores the empirical effect of crime on the 
supply of credit to firms and the characteristics of loan contracts, investigating the different 
mechanisms of high operating costs, risk, information opaqueness and trust. Italy has wide and 
relatively persistent differences in economic development, crime rates and financial development. 
Microeconomic data on a very large number of bank loans is available from the Central Credit 
Register. Information on the lender and the borrower for each loan can be used to control for a 
number of bank and borrower characteristics.  
One important advantage of within-country data is that they make it possible to 
abstract from differences in the legal systems and focus on one outcome of poor 
governance, namely crime, controlling for local economic conditions.
2 The results from 
cross-country studies are more strongly affected by omitted variables. The second 
advantage of bank-firm data from one country is that the same banks are lending to similar 
firms located in different regions and many firms have multiple relationships, thus giving 
researchers a robust way of controlling for bank and borrower characteristics. Finally, the 
richness of the data is such as to permit testing a number of hypotheses on why crime 
affects credit terms and conditions. 
This paper is related to the literature on the social cost of crime. Most of the relevant studies 
take the approach of adding up the losses from crime, including the value of lives lost due to 
murder, the resources spent on crime prevention, and other indirect costs (Anderson (1999)). Other 
studies estimate the social cost of crime by examining housing prices in communities with different 
levels of crime (Thaler (1975)). There is little evidence on the costs of crime in terms of 
underinvestment. Survey data indicate that entrepreneurs take the probability of expropriation and 
the costs of crime into account when they make business location choices (e.g. GEM (2000); 
British Chambers of Commerce (2004); Krkoska and Robeck (2006)). 
This paper also relates to the literature on institutions and growth, as the availability of bank 
credit is a key factor of development, particularly for small firms. Recent cross-country studies find 
a positive relation between indices measuring the degree of rule of law or law enforcement and 
financial development, even when differences in the legal systems are taken into accounted.
3 The 
––––– 
2  In most studies that focus on the formal aspects of the law it is often difficult to separate the effect of these variables from the actual 
efficacy of the institutions. In particular, systems with laws that imply advanced protection of property rights, creditor rights, etc., 
tend to be characterized by relatively better law enforcement as well. 
3  A different strand of literature relates growth, financial development and the law (see Beck and Levine, 2003 for a survey), focusing 
on the content of the law in terms of property rights, creditor rights and investor protection. 
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positive effect of institutions on financial development is independent from the direct effect that 
these variables have on growth. Furthermore, there is evidence supporting the view that the 
effectiveness of institutions is as important as the legal design. Bae and Goyal (2009) find that 
terms on syndicated loans for a large sample of firms from different countries are influenced more 
strongly by the degree of enforceability of contracts than by indicators of creditor rights protection. 
Investigating the effects of crime on the functioning of credit markets can therefore be of more 
general relevance, given the impact that financial development and better access to credit have on 
growth.  
The main results are the following. Firms located in high-crime areas pay interest rates that 
are around 30 basis points higher than those paid by similar firms in low-crime areas, comparing 
firms in provinces at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of the crime rate. Considering 
underreporting in crime statistics, the effect is much larger. The data provide evidence of 
heterogeneous effects of crime in relation to firm size (the spread charged to small firms is affected 
by crime). Furthermore, the incidence of crime is positively correlated with the share of 
collateralized loans and with differences in the composition of borrowing by firms. In further 
detail, the share of revolving credit lines is positively correlated with crime and the share of asset-
backed lending (lending against accounts receivable) is negatively correlated. The data also suggest 
that the presence of crime where the firm operates reduces access to credit. 
 
2. The data 
A. Data on bank-borrower relationships 
The data on the cost of credit, loan composition and collateral are obtained from the Central 
Credit Register, a system managed by the Bank of Italy that tracks the credit exposures of the 
clients of resident banks. Banks can submit inquiries to it about loan applicants, ,specifically 
regarding their total amount of borrowing outstanding and default history, in order to check their 
creditworthiness. The Central Credit Register includes borrowers with loan commitments or loans 
in place that exceed the threshold of €75,000. 
The first source of data consists of the cross-section of all bank-borrower relationships 
observed at the end of the year 2000 referring to businesses. Banks report the size of the 
commitment, the type of loan, the amount of credit actually disbursed and whether the loan is 
collateralized. This information is also divided by type of loans, considering: i) loans backed by 
accounts receivable, ii) term loans, and iii) revolving credit lines. A subset of 68 banks also 
provides information on the interest rates charged on each of these types of loan. 
The data on bank-firm relationships are then matched with information from firms’ 
balance sheets and income statements in Cerved, a proprietary data base that collects 
information on approximately 500,000 firms yearly based on Italy’s official company 
register. In the case of small firms, balance sheet information is limited to the main items. 
Cerved also provides a z score measuring the probability of default of the firm computed 
with linear discriminant analysis (see Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994) for details of the 
method), described below. 
The resulting data set includes more than 515,000 bank-firm relationships referring 
to some 170,000 borrowers and 839 banks. The interest rate data are available for almost 
330,000 relationships and 67 banks. In the main regressions only the complete data are 
used; in robustness tests the relationships of firms for which the Cerved data are missing 
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(sole proprietorships) are also used. The data on interest rates is winsorized at the 1
st and 
99
th percentiles since extreme values tend to reflect measurement error. 
 
B. Crime data 
Crime data are published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat). The variable 
CRIME is the ratio of the total number of offenses in a province for which the authorities have 
opened a judicial procedure to the province’s population. Yearly data for the period 1997-2000 are 
averaged over time. As discussed below, crime rates are computed for total offenses and for a 
number of different categories of crime. The use of province-level crime rates is consistent both 
with the definition of relevant credit markets adopted by the Italian Antitrust Authority in regard to 
small businesses and with prior research (Guiso et al. (2005)). 
In general, crime statistics are biased by underreporting, especially as regards minor 
offenses. Underreporting is likely to affect areas with different true crime rates unequally, although 
the bias could go both ways. One advantage of the Italian data is that it is possible in part to control 
for differences across regions in the propensity to report a crime. Istat runs a survey in which 
participants are asked if they were victims of a crime, whether they reported it to the police, and, if 
not, why. The percentage of reported crimes varies significantly across Italy and can be employed 
as an inverse proxy of underreporting. The survey data refer to 1997-98 and can be aggregated by 
macro-regions (Italy has 5 of these in official statistics); unfortunately, the sample is too small to be 
representative for smaller aggregations such as provinces. The offenses included in the survey are 
defined as “crimes against the individual” and include theft, robbery and assault.  
In the regressions the adjustment for underreporting is performed by including the variable 
REPORT among the explanatory variables. In robustness tests the types of crime that are subject to 
underreporting are corrected by multiplying the official rates by 1/REPORT. One of the main 
reasons why respondents do not report a crime is that they think that the police cannot solve the 
problem; therefore, the coefficient of the variable REPORT is of interest in itself because it 
captures the effect on credit markets of the level of popular trust in the effectiveness of the police.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the crime rate and other province-level variables for 
the 95 Italian provinces. 
 
C. Environmental variables 
Local credit market conditions are affected by the degree of competition in the banking 
industry and other supply characteristics. The other control variables are obtained from Istat and 
supervisory statistical reports to the Bank of Italy. The data are annual observations for 2000.  
One important variable to be considered is the inefficiency of the courts in the different 
provinces, which has been shown to affect the development of credit markets (Bianco, Jappelli and 
Pagano (2005)) and the extent to which households are financially constrained (Fabbri and Padula 
(2004)). Although there is no evidence that it affects the cost of credit, it is likely to have an impact 
on other loan characteristics, which would be consistent with international evidence (Qian and 
Strahan (2005)). The variable INEFF, employed as a control, measures the average number of days 
it took to complete a first-level court civil trial in 1998 and is obtained from Istat (see Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales ( 2004)). 
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Other environmental variables control for economic and credit market conditions in each 
province: the log of value added for aggregate demand conditions and for differences in size 
between provinces (LNGDP); the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration in the loan market 
(HERF) controls for differences in the degree of competition; the variable BRANCHD measures 
local branch density and is the ratio of the number of branches to the population (in thousands). 
This variable is included as a measure of spatial competition, since concentration may not be 
sufficient to describe the banking industry’s local structure. 
 
D. Firm and bank controls 
Firm control variables are intended to capture differences in the demand for credit and in the 
solvency of the borrower. The following are included in the regressions. Firm size is measured by 
total assets, based on which I construct five size classes: less than €500,000, between €500,000 and 
€1.5 million, between €1.5 million and €5 million, between €5 million and €20 million, and more 
than 20 million. The share of tangible assets is measured by the ratio of fixed tangible assets to 
total assets (FTANG), while firm age is the log of the years of operation (FAGE). Both of these 
variables are proxies for opaqueness, because a firm with more tangible assets or one that has been 
on the market for a long time should be easier for potential lenders to evaluate. The share of 
tangible assets also controls for the availability of collateral. As an additional control for the degree 
of firm opaqueness I include a set of dummy variables for the legal form of the firm: CORP 
(corporation),  LLIAB (small limited liability company), COOP (cooperative). The civil code 
establishes stricter accounting requirements for corporations and limited liability firms than for 
other businesses. Corporations differ from other limited liability companies because they have a 
higher initial capital requirement. The excluded category consists of other minor types of firms, 
mainly limited partnerships, typically more opaque than the other four types because they have 
minimal accounting requirements. 
Firm profitability is measured by operating profits divided by total assets (FPROF). I include 
the variable RATING, a credit score measuring the probability of default generated by linear 
discriminant analysis (see Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994) for a description of the method). The 
z score is provided by CADS and maps a numerical score into 9 categories, with z’s of 1 indicating 
the lowest credit risk and 9 the highest. CADS maps the score into four levels of risk: i) safe (score 
of 1 or 2), solvent (3, 4), vulnerable (5, 6), risky (7, 8, 9). Finally, industry dummies referring to the 
22 industry classification, consistent with the SEC95, are included in the regressions. 
Bank characteristics are absorbed by bank fixed effects in all the specifications. The share of 
branches of bank j in the province where the firm is located is included because the rate charged by 
each bank could depend on how important that bank is in the market, its reputation and its market 
share (SHARE). The sign of the coefficient is ambiguous: if the bank has a large share, it might use 
its market power to charge higher prices under the standard Structure-Conduct-Performance 
hypothesis, but on the other hand it might have a large share precisely because it is more efficient, 
in which case the relationship between rate and market share would be reversed. The bank-firm 
relationship variables and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
The empirical model measuring the impact of crime on credit contracts is an equation that 
relates the terms of the loan (interest rate, collateral, etc.) for borrower i from bank j in province p 
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to the crime rate in province p, the characteristics of firm i and bank j, and other control variables 
for province p. The equation has the following form: 
 
 yijp  = α + β CRIMEp + Γ PROV_CONTROLSp+ ∆ FIRM_CONTROLSi +  
 +  Φ BANK_CONTROLSj  + εijp  (1) 
 
In the cases of a binary dependent variable, the model is estimated with a Logit specification. 
 
A. The cost of credit 
In the first set of regressions the relationship between the interest rate and crime is explored. 
In addition to the average rate on all loans, the rates on four types of loans are analyzed: asset-
backed lending (type 1), term loans with a maturity of 18 months or less (type 2ST), term loans 
with a maturity greater than 18 months (type 2LT), and revolving credit lines (type 3). Firm 
controls include the legal form of firm, firm size dummy variables, profitability, the share of 
tangible assets, the age of the firm (log of years of operation), the z score, and the industry 
dummies. Bank characteristics are controlled for with fixed effects. The only bank variable that 
varies by province is the bank's market share in the province where the firm has its headquarters. 
Market controls are the index of concentration, court inefficiency, branch density in the province, 
and per capita value added. For robustness, I also included the log of total credit outstanding for 
each pair given by firm i and bank j. This specification is not shown: the results are very similar, 
since quantity is partly endogenous with respect to price. 
As shown in Table 3, the coefficient of CRIME is positive and statistically different from 
zero. The economic effect comparing a province at the 25
th and one at the 75
th percentile of the 
crime rate (from 22.5 to 34.1) is an increase in the cost of credit of 0.24, i.e. 24 basis points. The 
coefficient of REPORT is significant and negative, which is consistent with the intuition that credit 
markets tend to work more smoothly where there is more trust in institutions; the economic effect 
of increasing the reporting rate from the minimum (23.8 percent) to the maximum (42.5 percent) is 
a reduction in the rate of around 75 basis points. The combined effect of high crime and a low 
reporting rate is economically substantial. The difference between the average cost of credit in the 
province with the lowest crime rate (13.5) in the highest reporting area and the province with the 
highest crime rate (49.4) in the lowest reporting area is estimated at 150 basis points. 
The coefficients of the control variables are mostly significant and have the expected sign. 
Large, more profitable firms, with more tangible assets and lower credit risk tend to pay less for 
credit. Controlling for size, corporations have a lower cost of credit than other firms, one 
explanation being that they are more transparent and have stricter accounting requirements. Court 
inefficiency has an adverse effect on the cost of credit, as found in other studies.  
Columns 2 through 5 report the results for the cost of different types of loan. Crime increases 
the cost of all types of credit except revolving credit lines. The economic effect on the cost of loans 
secured by accounts receivable is the largest, around 31 basis points; the economic effect is 8 basis 
points for term loans with a maturity of less than 18 months and just 3.4 basis points for long-term 
loans. The variable REPORT is correlated negatively with the cost of the first three types of credit, 
again with a larger economic effect that is greater for loans against accounts receivable than for the 
other types of loan. 
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B. Heterogeneous effects across firms 
The literature on financial intermediation suggests that small firms are more opaque and 
more subject to financing constraints than large firms. For these reasons they are more subject to 
market power and usually borrow close to home. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) find that 
small and medium-sized enterprises interviewed in a survey for a large number of countries are 
more sensitive to the negative effect of corruption on growth. In addition, to the extent that crime 
increases firm opaqueness, we expect that the impact of crime on the cost of credit will vary 
inversely with firm size. 
Large borrowers have access to larger credit markets and are better able to convey 
information on their quality. Disregarding this potential heterogeneity could bias the coefficient of 
CRIME. To take heterogeneity into account, I include an interaction term between the firm-size 
dummies and CRIME. 
As reported in Table 4, the coefficients of the interaction terms between CRIME and the 
firm-size dummies are negative and statistically significant, indicating that the increase in the cost 
of credit associated with crime declines as firm size increases. In economic terms, there is no effect 
on largest size classes, as the derivative is not different from zero. 
 
C. Collateral 
Crime is likely to affect not only the cost of credit but other contractual arrangements too. 
According to most theories of collateral, banks use it as a device to reduce asymmetric information 
problems generated by moral hazard and/or adverse selection. The bankers’ view is instead that 
collateral serves to reduce loss given default and the capital charge. Both of these explanations 
suggest that collateral should be more common in high-crime areas, either because firms are more 
opaque or because banks want to protect their investment in the presence of higher default risk. 
Evidence from cross-country data in Bae and Goyal (2009) is consistent with a negative 
relationship between collateral and enforcement of property rights. 
The presence of collateral is related to the type of loan, ceteris paribus. For this reason I 
estimate three different regressions, respectively for total credit, short-term and medium-long term 
loans. The explanatory variables are the same ones employed in the interest rate regressions. The 
regression is estimated with different specifications. In the first specification the dependent variable 
is the share of collateralized credit. In the second specification the dependent variable is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if credit is partly or fully collateralized, 0 otherwise. In a third specification (not 
shown), the model is estimated as a Tobit, with the share of collateralized credit as the dependent 
variable, bounded by construction between 0 and 100. The results are very similar but the model 
does not perform very well in predicting the share of collateralized credit for observations that are 
not close to the mean. Furthermore, in the Tobit model bank controls are included instead of the 
very large number of fixed effects that makes the estimation too cumbersome and subject to 
potential estimation problems. 
In Table 5, the results show that CRIME has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, indicating that firms in higher-crime areas tend to have a higher share of collateralized 
borrowing. Comparing the 25
th and 75
th percentiles, the economic effect is around 1 percentage 
point. It is larger for medium-long term loans, exceeding 2 percentage points. In the Logit 
specification the results are qualitatively similar. In economic terms, the probability of observing 
collateral rises by 1.2 percentage points when the crime rate increases from the 25
th to the 75
th 
percentile in the regression for total loans; for medium-long term loans, the probability increases by 
3.5 percentage points. 
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In both models the interaction terms between firm size and crime have negative coefficients, 
suggesting that the increase in collateral associated with higher crime diminishes as firm size 
increase. Given the size of the coefficients, the effect of crime is close to zero for the fourth size 
class and negative, though small, for the largest borrowers. 
 
D. Composition of loans and maturity 
Crime could  also affect credit supply conditions by modifying banks’ incentives to make  – 
and firms’ demand for – different types of loans. In addition, for some kinds of loans, there could 
be credit rationing that is not reflected in prices.  This section discusses the results of a set of 
regressions in which the composition of loans is related to the crime variables and the same set of 
controls employed in previous tests. Although these regressions cannot distinguish between 
demand and supply effects, the results can be read in combination with those on price and collateral 
to infer some conclusions on the effect of crime on the supply of credit. The dependent variables 
are the shares of each firm’s loan commitments in each type of credit (loans against accounts 
receivable, short-term loans, long-term loans and revolving credit lines). The large number of bank 
fixed effects makes a Tobit specification unsuitable. A standard OLS model is therefore estimated, 
even though the dependent variables are portfolio shares bounded between 0 and 1. The results, 
reported in Table 6, show that crime is correlated negatively with the share of asset-backed loans 
(mainly loans against accounts receivable) and positively with the share of revolving credit lines. 
This finding is consistent with the need for banks to monitor firms more closely and to have more 
flexibility in determining the amount of borrowing in the short term (Diamond (2004)). Revolving 
credit lines are the most flexible type of loan from the lender’s point of view, since the bank can 
monitor how much the firm uses and scale down the committed amount anytime if the firm’s 
financial conditions become fragile. At the other end, loans against accounts receivable require a 
better knowledge of the businesses with which the borrower has relationships and increase risk in a 
very opaque or uncertain environment. 
 
4. What drives the correlation between crime and the cost of credit? 
A. Social disruption and types of offense 
One alternative explanation of the correlation between CRIME and outcomes in credit 
markets could be that unobserved factors such as social disruption and poverty affect both the 
crime rate and loan contracts. To some extent, including a measure of default risk should control 
for any effect of the business environment on the average quality of borrowers. A second test is 
based on splitting the crime rate into its main components. If the social disruption hypothesis is 
true, all types of crime that tend to be related to poverty should be correlated to the cost of credit, 
including violent crime. This hypothesis is investigated by replacing CRIME in the regression with 
four crime rates computed on specific types of offense. 
The first type consists of offenses against property and includes robbery, theft and dealing in 
stolen goods. These offences are positively correlated with wealth and economic activity and tend 
to be more common in urban areas. The second type consists of offences against individuals and 
includes injuries, private violence and threats, voluntary homicide and attempted homicide. The 
third type includes fraudulent bankruptcy, fraud and check fraud. They are grouped together on the 
hypothesis that they capture the likelihood that the counterparty in an economic transaction will 
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cheat. The fourth and last category comprises offenses that are believed to increase firm fragility 
and opaqueness, i.e. organized crime, mafia-related crime and extortion. 
The estimation of the impact of the different types of crime on the interest rate is reported in 
Table 8. The first two types of crime have positive but insignificant coefficients. The third and 
fourth types, both of which imply a direct impact on firm behavior, do influence credit spreads. 
Violent crime does not affect the cost of credit. The economic effect of organized crime on the 
average cost of credit (comparing provinces at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles) amounts to an increase 
of 21 basis points. The economic effect of type 4 is smaller: firms located in a province with a high 
rate of fraud and economic crime (75
th percentile) pay 7 basis points more than similar firms 
located in provinces where the rate is low (25
th percentile). 
The same types of crime that influence the cost of credit tend to be relevant also in the loan 
composition and collateral regressions. Type 3 crime reduces the use of loans against account 
receivables and increases the share of revolving credit lines. Type 4 (fraud) increase the likelihood 
of collateral and reduces the share of long term lending, which is an intuitive result. 
 
B. Banks’ operating costs 
The first possible mechanism through which crime affects lending is operating costs. The 
finding that robberies do not affect the cost of credit suggests that the effect of crime is not driven 
by higher security expenses, although the hypothesis cannot be tested directly because there are no 
branch-level data on operating costs. Furthermore, a simple cost-based explanation does not 
necessarily predict any effect of crime on collateral and loan composition. An indirect way to test 
the relevance of this channel is to compare the effect of crime on the cost of credit across banks 
that operate in high- and low-crime areas, considering similar borrowers. In the baseline model 
CRIME is measured with reference to the location of the borrower. If the bank operates prevalently 
in other regions, it would have lower average security expenses. I compute the average of the crime 
rates for each bank, weighted by its share of branches in each province. I add to the regression the 
variable WCRIME. An observationally equivalent borrower will pay more at a bank that has most 
of its branches in high crime areas if the bank is charging an extra cost due to security expenses. 
The correlation between the two variables is 0.36. The results for the interest rate regressions show 
that  CRIME remains significant and the coefficient is substantially the same; WCRIME has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the regression of the interest rate on term loans of up to 18 
months and is not significantly different from zero in the other regressions. 
In the loan composition regressions both CRIME and WCRIME have significant coefficients 
of the same sign: they are both associated with a higher share of revolving credit line commitments 
and a lower share of loans against accounts receivable. Similarly, WCRIME is statistically 
significant in the collateral regressions and always has a positive effect on the share and probability 
of observing a collateralized loans; the coefficient of CRIME in these regressions is unaffected by 
the presence of WCRIME. The same regressions are estimated dropping the observations for which 
CRIME and WCRIME are equal and the results are unchanged. 
Overall, the conclusion is that crime has an impact both at the bank level and at the borrower 
level on non-price terms but does not affect the pricing that a bank applies to all of its customers. 
Banks that operate in high-crime areas tend to have more collateralized loans and to lend more in 
the form of revolving credit lines and less in that of loans against accounts receivable, holding 
constant customers’ characteristics. Customers located in high-crime areas have a higher cost of 
credit from all banks, on average, controlling for all bank characteristics. The results only partially 
support a cost-based explanation and are not consistent with banks charging more to customers if 
they face higher costs related to crime. A plausible explanation for the effect of WCRIME on non-
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price terms appears to be that greater risks and uncertainty is reflected in more prudent overall 
lending strategies for banks whose portfolio is more concentrated in high-crime areas. 
 
C. Risk and loss given default 
In the basic regression the credit risk of the borrower is controlled for with a z score 
measuring the probability of default. Two other important component of credit risk could affect the 
bank’s decisions on pricing and other loan characteristics, and crime could have a substantial 
impact on both of them. One is the expected loss given default and the other is the volatility of the 
default rates of firms in a given class. CRIME could influence the loss given default in many ways. 
For example, if a firm defaults in a high-crime area, its assets are at greater risk of expropriation 
during the bankruptcy procedure, which typically takes many years. Or if there are “hidden” 
creditors that resort to illegal methods of enforcement, the residual creditors will be left with less 
assets to satisfy their claims. The inefficiency of the courts partly controls for the different length 
of bankruptcy procedures. The results show that it does affect the cost of credit since INEFF has a 
positive, significant coefficient in most of the regressions. It also affects the share and probability 
of collateralized lending. 
The degree of inefficiency of the courts affects the loss given default because lengthy 
procedures are typically associated with higher legal fees, greater risk of deterioration of the 
debtor’s assets, etc. I add an interaction term between CRIME and INEFF to all the regressions. 
The estimated coefficients of this term in the interest rate regressions are negative and statistically 
significant for loans secured by accounts receivable and both types of term loan (maturity up to 18 
months, over 18 months). Court inefficiency mitigates the adverse effect of crime on the cost of 
credit, which does not seem to be consistent with a loss given default explanation. One possible 
interpretation is that the differential in the cost due to differences in crime rates diminishes if courts 
are inefficient because the benefit of low crime in terms of expected value of liquidated assets is 
offset by the loss from court inefficiency. 
The interaction term has a qualitatively similar effect on the composition of loans. Loans 
against accounts receivable are used less extensively where crime rates are higher and courts are 
inefficient, but the interaction between the two variables has a positive coefficient, implying a 
mitigating effect of each variable on the other. The opposite holds for revolving credit lines, whose 
share increases with crime and court inefficiency. Interestingly, the interaction term between crime 
and judicial inefficiency is not significant in the collateral regressions, although the two variables 
have strong independent effects. 
The second channel through which crime could affect credit risk and thus the terms of credit 
contracts is the accuracy of banks’ default estimates based on historical data or experience, i.e. the 
volatility of the predicted probability of default. The probability of default of observationally 
equivalent firms should be harder to predict in a high-crime area than in a low-crime area. For one 
thing, the volatility of the underlying environment could be higher because of business conditions. 
Second, if fraud is more common, it represents an additional source of unsystematic risk that banks 
incorporate into their pricing, in line with the findings on the types of crime. 
I test this hypothesis by estimating the probability of default of the firms in the sample for 
high- and low-crime provinces and comparing the prediction error and model’s ability to explain 
default with a given set of explanatory variables. Crime could affect not only the average 
probability of default of a given firm, but also the accuracy of the estimate of such probability. 
Provinces can be divided into above and below median and a Logit regression of the probability of 
observing default of the firms in the sample estimated for a window of three years after the year of 
the sample. 
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I observe the borrowers in the three years following the sample year and verify if they 
default. In case of default by the third year, I construct a dummy DEFAULT equal to 1, zero 
otherwise. This dummy is regressed on observed firm characteristics and market controls. 
Comparing the high- and low-crime provinces, there are no substantial differences in the model fit, 
based on the Hosmer-Lemeshow test; in both models over 95 percent of observations are correctly 
classified, but these only include the negative outcomes (no default). The regression is unable to 
predict default based on the 0.5 predicted value threshold. Further testing is required to be able to 
reject the hypothesis of greater difficulty in predicting default given the firm’s observable 
characteristics, although these finding would suggest that CRIME affects risk by increasing the 
probability of default, given the firm’s rating. 
The model is estimated adding CRIME to the variables on the right-hand side. The 
coefficient of CRIME is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the crime rate has an 
independent effect on default even controlling for the risk class of the firm (RATING). Raising 
CRIME from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile results in an increase in the default probability of 0.01, 
against the predicted default probability of 0.027. I also interact CRIME with RATING and find that 
the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant. Since CRIME has a direct effect on default, 
controlling for RATING, as a robustness test the main regressions (interest rate, collateral and loan 
shares) are all estimated including among the explanatory variables a dummy equal to one if the 
firm will default in the following three years. This variable is a proxy for characteristics correlated 
with risk that the bank might observe and incorporate in the interest rate and other terms but are not 
included in the data. 
In all of the regressions the coefficient of CRIME is statistically significant and its magnitude 
is increased by the inclusion of DEFAULT among the regressors. The dummy DEFAULT is 
significant and has a positive coefficient in the interest rate and loan composition regressions; it is 
not significant in the collateral regressions. On average, firms that will default within the three-year 
window pay a premium of around 1 percentage point compared with the other borrowers. The 
premium is charged on all types of loans. It amounts to about 34 basis points for term loans with a 
maturity beyond 18 months and 80 basis points for other loans. 
 
D. Asymmetric information 
The finding that large firms are unaffected by crime rates is consistent with the hypothesis 
that information asymmetries are exacerbated by crime, given that firm size is negatively correlated 
with opaqueness. The importance of information asymmetries in explaining the observed 
correlation between crime and the cost of credit can be tested by comparing banks that should be 
informed to a differing extent about local borrowers. A bank that is well established in the market 
is likely to possess local knowledge about borrowers. If firms are generally more opaque as a 
consequence of crime, an inside bank should be able to acquire soft information on borrowers’ true 
financial and economic conditions. An outside bank will not be part of the local network and will 
have less access to such information. Similarly, a new entrant bank will need time to acquire local 
soft information
4. 
I test this hypothesis by adding to the regression a dummy REGB equal to 1 if the bank is 
chartered in the same region as the province, 0 otherwise, and an interaction term of REGB and 
CRIME. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between CRIME and REGB is generally 
not statistically different from zero in the interest rate regressions. 
––––– 
4  An opposite effect can occur if banks that have less information choose not to lend to the riskier firms. Observed interest rates 
would be lower, on average, because, given the same broad observable characteristics (industry, size) the average credit risk of the 
pool of borrowers is lower. 
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Another proxy for firm opaqueness used in the literature is the share of tangible 
assets. Firms that use extensively human capital are more difficult to evaluate and their 
business harder to monitor as opposed to firms that employ mostly physical capital. I add 
the interaction term between CRIME and the share of the firm’s tangible assets FTANG 
and find that the coefficient is never significant in the interest rate, collateral and loan 
composition regressions. 
Finally, I interact CRIME with the legal type dummy variables CORP, LLIAB and 
COOP. One of the main differences between these types of businesses is the strictness of 
accounting requirements imposed by the Civil Code. Again, the interaction terms are not 
statistically different from zero in all the models estimated. 
The general conclusion from these tests is that asymmetric information does not 
appear to be empirically relevant in explaining the effect of crime on the terms of loan 
contracts. However, one explanation could be that asymmetric information problems, 
expected to be worse in high-crime areas, induce more subtle restrictions of credit supply, 
especially for the very opaque firms that are not in the Central Credit Register. Firms that 
are in the register are already transparent enough to access credit markets. Furthermore, 
high-crime areas tend to show financial underdevelopment on the demand side as well, 
with firms tending to make extensive use of cash and to avoid resorting to banks and 
formal credit markets (Fabbri and Padula 2004). Banks could be unwilling to lend to 
certain types of borrowers in high-crime areas because they cannot ensure a positive return 
by increasing interest rates or requiring collateral if firms that are similar when judged by 
hard information could actually be different different, for example because accounting is 
not as reliable. 
By definition, rationing is difficult to measure because we would like to know if 
firms with the same characteristics have different likelihoods of obtaining credit depending 
on the crime rate in the province where they are located. Unfortunately, there are no 
available data on loan application rejection rates. Furthermore, the fact that a firm responds 
that it would have wanted more credit on the same conditions but did not get it is not 
necessarily a good measure of rationing. I use resort to an alternative, the probability that a 
firm overdraws its credit lines. Overdrafts are very expensive and are used only if the firm 
cannot access other sources of funds; although they are not a measure of rationing, they do 
capture the extent to which the borrower is liquidity-constrained. 
A second measure is the probability that a borrower with given characteristics (size, 
industry, etc.) has access to bank credit. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
borrower is in the Central Credit Register, 0 otherwise. Since the register has an entry 
threshold, the dependent variable measures the probability that the borrower has bank 
credit (drawn or committed) of at least €75,000. Since the regression controls for firm size 
(sales and assets), it captures the probability that the firm borrows at least a given amount 
from the banking system. The results show that CRIME has a negative coefficient that is 
also statistically different from zero, as expected (Table 10). In economic terms the effect 
is around 5 percentage points for the 25
th versus 75
th percentile comparison, with an 
average estimated probability of 0.69 of being in the Central Credit Register’s records. 
Similarly, the probability that a firm overdraws on its credit line is positively affected by 
CRIME; the magnitude of the effect is around 2.5 percentage points, with an estimated 
probability of overdrawing of 42.1. Further analysis is required to see whether there are 
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subsamples of firms for which these effects can be economically large. Overall, the results 
suggest that crime does influence access to bank credit in a way that is not mitigated by 
knowledge of the local market. 
 
E. Culture or business environment? 
Some recent studies have emphasized the role of cultural differences in economic 
transactions (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008). Banks may discriminate against borrowers from 
high-crime areas because they trust them less. Fraud is an important factor, as suggested by the 
results with crime types. However, it is not clear whether banks consider these borrowers more 
likely to cheat or whether the borrowers are more fragile because other agents in the economic 
environment tend to cheat more. 
To test these two different channels – discrimination due to prejudice versus environment - I 
focus on a sample of small borrowers for whom it is possible to know the province of birth as well 
as the province where they operate their business. If the impact of crime is related to 
discrimination, we should find some effect of the crime rate of the province of birth even 
controlling for the crime rate of the province where the business is located. If crime has an impact 
through the business environment, the first variable should have no effect on credit supply 
conditions. 
I resort to Central Credit Register data on sole proprietorships. In this case the identity of the 
business coincides with that of its owner. I construct the variable CRIMEBIRTH as the crime rate 
of the province where the business owner was born and add it to the regressions. The regression is 
modified since the firm control variables are missing for sole proprietorship, which do not have 
balance sheet data. As a proxy for size I use total credit granted to the firm, both drawn and 
undrawn. Industry dummies partly control for risk. The market control variables are the same as in 
all of the previous regressions. 
Before adding CRIMEBIRTH, the interest rate and collateral regressions are estimated with 
the sample of sole proprietorships. The results are consistent with those for the other firms; the lack 
of balance sheet controls does not influence the general findings, except for the precision of the 
estimates, which are slightly less statistically significant. 
In the regressions with both variables, the coefficient of CRIMEBIRTH is never statistically 
different from zero; the effect of CRIME is robust and very similar to that found in the main data 
set. These results suggest that the increase in the cost of credit and the greater use of collateral 
associated with higher crime are not the result of discrimination or an intrinsic characteristic of the 
borrower but have to do with the environment where borrowers operate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper provides evidence that the presence of crime has an adverse effect 
on credit terms and conditions for business borrowers. Controlling for a number of firm and market 
characteristics and including bank fixed effects in the regressions, the results show that crime has a 
statistically significant effect on the cost of short-term credit. Crime also increases the demand for 
collateral by banks and the composition of credit across different types of loans; firms in high-
crime areas resort relatively less to loans against accounts receivable and more to revolving credit 
lines. The results are driven by organized crime, extortion and fraud. The findings suggests that 
crime, one of the outcomes of poor governance, not only has direct  repercussions on economic 
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activity but also indirectly affects investment by reducing the availability of credit and distorting 
loan terms and conditions. 
 




Crime in Italian provinces and reporting rates 
 
The data refer to the 95 Italian provinces; crime rates are averages of yearly rates for the period 1996-
2000. The source is the National Institute of Statistics (Istat). 
 
Variable Definition Mean  Min.  25th  75th  Max 
  
CRIME  Number of offences for which the 
judiciary has started a procedure 
divided by province population
(thousands). 
30.14 13.48 22.55 34.15 79.44
CRIME1  Number of cases of robbery, theft and 
resale of stolen goods, divided by 
population (thousands). 
25.71 10.05 18.69 30.10 61.16
CRIME2  Voluntary homicide, attempted 
homicide, assault, threats, private 
violence.   
1.84 0.54 1.35 2.22 4.06
CRIME3  Fraudulent bankruptcy, fraud, check 
fraud. 
0.14 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.48
CRIME4 Organized  crime,  mafia-related 
organized crime, extortion. 
1.96 0.68 1.32 2.12 13.39
REPORT  Share of offenses against individuals 
reported to law enforcement officers, 
by geographic area (North- West, 
North-East, Center, South and Islands . 
Source:  Indagine sulla sicurezza dei 
cittadini, Istat, 1998). 
0.334 0.238 .. .. 0.425
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Table 2 
Bank-firm relationships: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  S.  Dev  Min  Max 
 Dependent  Variables
RATE  Weighted average interest rate on total credit 
drawn (fourth quarter of the year) 
8.99 4.56 4.46  36.78
RATE_1  Interest rate on asset-backed loans   7.22 2.17  4.74  17.31
RATE_2ST  Interest rate on term loans, short term  7.15 3.24  1.18  36.78
RATE_2LT  Interest rate on term loans, medium-long term  6.64 1.60  2.87  36.78
RATE_3  Interest rate on revolving credit lines  13.46 11.19  4.46  72.86
SHARE_1  Ratio of loan commitments against accounts 
receivable to total commitments 
43.26 36.96 0  100
SHARE_2ST  Ratio of term loan commitments with a 
maturity of less than 18 months to total 
commitments 
9.98 22.69 0  100
SHARE_2LT  Ratio of term loan commitments with a 
maturity of 18 months or more to total 
commitments 
14.46 29.76 0  100
SHARE_3  Ratio of revolving credit lines to total loan 
commitments 
32.30 34.00 0  100
COLL_TOTAL  Share of collateralized total lending  11.76 29.15  0  100
COLL_ ST  Share of collateralized short-term loans  2.82 14.17  0  100
COLL_LT  Share of collateralized long-term loans  40.05 47.83  0  100
DCOLL_TOT  Dummy equal to 1 if the lending relationship is 
partly or fully collateralized, 0 otherwise 
0.17 0.37 0 1
DCOLL_ST  Dummy equal to 1 if short-term lending is 
partly or fully collateralized, 0 otherwise 
0.05 0.23 0 1
DCOLL_LT  Dummy equal to 1 if long-term lending is 
partly or fully collateralized, 0 otherwise 
0.43 0.49 0 1
Control Variables 
CORP Corporation,  dummy  0.26 0.44  0  1
LLIAB  Limited liability company  0.70 0.46  0  1
COOP Cooperative,  dummy  0.04 0.19  0  1
FSIZE2  Dummy equal to 1 if firm assets are between 
€0.5 million and €1.5 million, 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.43 0 1
FSIZE3  Dummy equal to 1 if firm assets are between 
€1.5 million and 5 million, 0 otherwise  
0.32 0.47 0 1
FSIZE4  Dummy equal to 1 if firm assets are between €5 
million and 20 million, 0 otherwise 
0.22 0.41 0 1
FSIZE5  Dummy equal to 1 if firm assets are greater 
than €20 million, 0 otherwise  
0.09 0.28 0 1
FPROF Operating  profits/sales  0.018 6.831  -2351.5  699
FTANG  Tangible assets/total assets  0.21 0.20  0  1
FAGE  Log of years of operation (censored at 20)  2.68 1.20  0  7.60
RATING  z score (higher values imply higher risk)  5.19 1.78  1  9
HERFP  Herfindahl index of concentration of loan 
market (province) 
0.07 0.03 0.04 0.23
INEFF  Inefficiency of the courts measured by length in 
years of a first-degree civil court trial, from 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). 
3.15 1.02 1.44 8.32
VAPC  Per capita value added of the province where 
the firm is headquartered, thousands of euros. 
20.64 4.32 9.70  27.56
LOGBRANCH  Log of province branches  6.20 0.85  3.47  7.74
MKTSHARE  Share of loans in market m issued by bank i  0.07 0.07  0  0.44
.No. obs.   (Sample with information on rates)  329827    
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Table 3 
Bank-firm relationships: Interest rates by loan type 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. The dependent variable RATE is the effective 
interest rate charged on outstanding credit.  RATE1 is the cost of loans secured by accounts 
receivable; RATE2ST is the cost of short-term loans; RATE2LT is the cost of term loans with a 
maturity of more than 18 months; RATE3 is the cost of revolving credit lines used. Standard errors 
are clustered at the province level and are Huber-White robust. 
 
DEP. VAR.:  RATE  RATE_1  RATE_2ST  RATE_2LT  RATE_3 
 Coeff.  Sign.  Coeff.  Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff. Sign. 
CRIME 0.021  ***  0.027 ***  0.007 ***  0.003 **  0.008   
 0.004    0.008   0.002   0.001   0.007   
REPORT -3.911  ***  -3.335 **  -1.427 ***  -0.638 **  1.131   
 1.055    1.521   0.548   0.250   2.295   
SIZE2 -0.536  ***  -0.774 ***  -0.347 ***  -0.152 ***  -0.340  *** 
 0.041    0.170   0.066   0.021   0.099   
SIZE3 -1.100  ***  -1.270 ***  -0.713 ***  -0.347 ***  -0.816  *** 
 0.042    0.192   0.074   0.033   0.099   
SIZE4 -1.793  ***  -1.940 ***  -1.133 ***  -0.531 ***  -1.756  *** 
 0.060    0.204   0.090   0.038   0.159   
SIZE5 -2.493  ***  -2.525 ***  -1.584 ***  -0.755 ***  -3.327  *** 
 0.079    0.209   0.109   0.063   0.169   
CORP -0.796  ***  -0.779 *  -0.630 *  -0.308 ***  -0.673  * 
 0.149    0.442   0.352   0.099   0.385   
LLIAB -0.441  ***  -0.445   -0.412  -0.137  -0.160   
 0.152    0.433   0.359   0.094   0.390   
COOP 0.030    -0.414   -0.110   0.051   1.447  *** 
 0.181    0.447   0.382   0.113   0.428   
FPROFIT -0.004  ***  0.001   0.007 **  -0.003 ***  -0.011  *** 
 0.001    0.002   0.003   0.0006   0.002   
FTANG -0.546  ***  0.318   -0.328 ***  -0.160 ***  -1.612  *** 
 0.064    0.212   0.104   0.044   0.182   
FAGE 0.005    0.003   -0.006   0.032 ***  -0.185  *** 
 0.010    0.023   0.010   0.007   0.034   
RATING 0.083  ***  0.013   0.156 ***  0.067 ***  -0.132  ** 
 0.020    0.044   0.013   0.005   0.047   
HERFMKT 0.294    1.026   -0.779   0.080   -0.521   
 1.053    1.869   0.884   0.460   3.334   
INEFF 0.114  ***  0.058   0.041   0.013   0.226  *** 
 0.037    0.078   0.030   0.017   0.081   
VAPC -0.103  ***  -0.064 ***  -0.070 ***  -0.016 ***  -0.080  ** 
 0.019    0.019   0.010   0.005   0.031   
LOGBRANCH 0.188  ** -0.054   0.191 ***  0.092 ***  0.440  ** 
 0.078    0.159   0.059   0.027   0.175   
MKTSHARE -0.826  ***  0.369   0.031   -0.027   -0.242   
 0.295    0.591   0.314   0.138   0.723   
CONSTANT 11.723  ***  10.736 ***  7.158 ***  6.418 *** 13.532  *** 
 0.508    1.227 0.603 0.220   1.371 
Bank fixed effects  YES    YES YES YES   YES 
          
Adj. R-squared  0.127   0.013  0.225 0.108   0.068 
No. obs.  329827   195518  58338 60510   278844 
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Table 4 
Bank-firm relationships: Interest rates by loan type 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. The dependent variable RATE is the effective 
interest rate charged on outstanding credit.  RATE1 is the cost of loans secured by accounts 
receivable; RATE2ST is the cost of short-term loans; RATE2LT is the cost of term loans with a 
maturity of more than 18 months; RATE3 is the cost of revolving credit lines used. Standard errors 
are clustered at the province level and are Huber-White robust. Firm controls are the same as in the 
specification in Table 3. 
 
DEP. VAR.:  RATE  RATE_1  RATE_2ST  RATE_2LT  RATE_3 
  Coeff.  Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff. Sign. 
CRIME  0.026 ***  0.017 *  0.016 ***  0.003   0.007  
  0.005    0.009   0.004  0.002  0.010   
SIZE2  -0.479 ***  -1.510 ***  -0.234   -0.180 ***  -0.458  
  0.121    0.428   0.154  0.067  0.362   
SIZE3  -0.936  ***  -1.465 ***  -0.494 *** -0.362 *** -0.767  ** 
  0.114    0.443   0.178  0.103  0.308   
SIZE4  -1.492  ***  -2.442 ***  -0.569 *** -0.541 *** -1.803  *** 
  0.149    0.458   0.196  0.100  0.431   
SIZE5  -2.118  ***  -2.544 ***  -0.923 *** -0.641 *** -3.157  *** 
  0.196    0.449   0.193  0.189  0.421   
CRIME*SIZE2  -0.001    0.019 **  -0.003  0.001  0.003   
  0.003    0.008   0.004  0.002  0.009   
CRIME*SIZE3  -0.004 *  0.005   -0.005   0.000   -0-001  
  0.002    0.008   0.005  0.003  0.007   
CRIME*SIZE4  -0.008 **  0.013   -0.014 ***  0.000   0.001  
  0.004    0.009   0.005  0.002  0.011   
CRIME*SIZE5  -0.009 **  0.0003   -0.016 ***  -0.003   -0.004  
  0.005    0.008   0.004  0.005  0.008   
REPORT  -3.966 ***  -3.347 **  -1.532 ***  -0.649 **  1.115  
  1.060    1.522   0.556  0.249  2.311   
CONSTANT  11.564 ***  11.118 ***  6.800 ***  6.429 ***  13.546 *** 
 0.479    1.335 0.666 0.233   1.308 
        
Firm controls  YES    YES YES YES   YES 
Bank fixed 
effects 
YES   YES YES YES  YES 
          
Adj. R-squared  0.127    0.013 0.226 0.108   0.068 
No. obs.  329827    195518 58338 60510   278844 
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Table 5 
Bank-firm relationships: Collateral 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. In the OLS regressions the dependent variable is 
ratio of collateralized credit to total outstanding credit, referring to total loans (_TOTAL), short-
term (_SHORT TERM) and long-term loans (_LONG TERM). In the Logit models the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the bank-firm relationships are partly or fully collateralized, considering 
respectively total credit, short-term and long-term credit. In the Logit models marginal effects are 
reported instead of coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the province level and are Huber-
White robust. 
 




  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
  Coeff.  dy/dx  Coeff.  dy/dx  Coeff.  dy/dx  
CRIME  0.102  *** 0.001 *** 0.061 ***  0.0002   0.227  *** 0.003  *** 
  0.019   0.0003   0.010  0.0002   0.064    0.001   
SIZE2  1.196 **  0.027 ***  0.822  ***  0.007 *  7.776 **  0.120 *** 
  0.448   0.006  0.274  0.004  1.265   0.015   
SIZE3  0.931   0.042 ***  0.914 **  0.009   11.761 ***  0.187 *** 
  0.567   0.014  0.422  0.007  1.391   0.019   
SIZE4  1.666  **  0.076 *** 1.571 *** 0.017   16.639  *** 0.281  *** 
  0.776   0.019  0.425  0.010  1.974   0.030   
SIZE5  4.583  *** 0.165 *** 1.856 *** 0.035   22.915  *** 0.401  *** 
  1.170   0.033  0.534  0.022  3.246   0.036   
CRIME*SIZE2  -0.037  *** -0.0006 ***  -0.035 *** -0.0002 **  -0.091  ***  -0.001  *** 
  0.012   0.0002   0.007  0.0001   0.038   0.0004   
CRIME*SIZE3  -0.054  ***  -0.001 ** -0.050 ***  -0.0004 ** -0.113  ***  -0.002  *** 
  0.014   0.0004   0.012  0.0002   0.034   0.0005   
CRIME*SIZE4  -0.077  *** -0.0016 ***  -0.072 *** -0.0007 ***  -0.162  ***  -0.003  *** 
  0.021   0.0004   0.011  0.0002   0.052   0.0008   
CRIME*SIZE5  -0.130  ***  -0.0024 *** -0.079 *** -0.010 **  -0.299  *** -0.004  *** 
  0.029   -0.0006   0.014  -0.0004   0.079    0.001   
REPORT  -7.324  *** -0.207 *** -4.314 *** -0.145 ***  -15.016  *  -0.129  *** 
  2.342   0.047  1.180  0.028  8.571   0.145   
CONSTANT  5.329  ***  -   -1.793   -   17.076  ***  -  
  2.318    - 1.271 - 5.888    - 
         
Pred.  prob.y=1     0.139 0.046    0.390 
         
Firm  controls  YES   YES YES YES YES   YES 
Bank fixed effects  YES    YES YES YES YES    YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.219    0.082 0.038  0.044 0.275   0.098   
No. obs.  426622   393266 382364 354548 129166   117475  
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Table 6 
Bank-firm relationships: Composition of loans 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. The dependent variable is the share of firms’ 
total bank credit available in the form of loans secured by accounts receivable (SHARE_1), short-
term loans (SHARE_2ST), term loans with a maturity of more than 18 months (SHARE_2LT) and 
revolving credit lines (SHARE_3). Standard errors are clustered at the province level and are 
Huber-White robust. 
 
DEP. VAR.:  SHARE_1  SHARE_2ST SHARE_2LT  SHARE_3 
  Coeff.  Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff.  Sign. 
CRIME  -0.216 ***  -0.002   0.027   0.195 *** 
  0.053   0.029   0.016   0.027  
SIZE2  4.072 ***  -0.015   -2.465 ***  -1.592  
  0.804   0.547   0.582   1.131  
SIZE3  5.379 ***  1.295   -3.458 ***  -3.216 ** 
  0.925   0.921   0.699   1.318  
SIZE4  5.285 ***  3.770 ***  -3.904 ***  -5.152 *** 
  1.187   1.182   0.919   1.076  
SIZE5  1.074   7.937 ***  -1.252   -7.760 *** 
  1.378   1.048   1.228   1.343  
CRIME*SIZE2  -0.001   0.018 *  0.013   -0.029  
  0.018   0.010   0.015   0.029  
CRIME*SIZE3  0.002   0.030   0.005   -0.037  
  0.018   0.021   0.017   0.034  
CRIME*SIZE4  -0.020   0.032   0.008   -0.019  
  0.033   0.030   0.023   0.026  
CRIME*SIZE5  -0.093   0.035   -0.006   0.064 ** 
  0.037   0.027   0.031   0.030  
REPORT  13.875 *  7.862 ***  -1.606   -20.131 *** 
  7.854   2.898   1.912   6.145  
CONSTANT  11.238 **  -113.272 ***  14.832 ***  59.359 *** 
 4.968  9.367 2.067   4.679 
      
Firm controls  YES  YES YES   YES 
Bank fixed effects  YES  YES YES   YES 
          
Adj. R-squared  0.258  0.120  0.363   0.214  
No. obs.  515396  515396  515396   515396  
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Table 7 
Cost of credit and types of crime 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. The dependent variable RATE is the effective 
interest rate charged on outstanding credit.  RATE1 is the cost of loans secured by accounts 
receivable; RATE2ST is the cost of short-term loans; RATE2LT is the cost of term loans with a 
maturity of more than 18 months; RATE3 is the cost of revolving credit lines used. Standard errors 
are clustered at the province level and are Huber-White robust. Firm controls are the same as the 
specification shown in Table 3. 
 
DEP. VAR.:  RATE  RATE_1  RATE_2ST  RATE_2LT  RATE_3 
  Coeff.    Coeff.  Coeff.    Coeff.    Coeff.   
CRIME1 0.004    0.010 0.001   0.001   0.005 
 0.004    0.012 0.004   0.002   0.013 
CRIME2 0.060    0.107 -0.026   -0.007   -0.028 
 0.053    0.129 0.059   0.027   0.169 
CRIME3 1.929  ***  0.767 1.715 *** -0.409   -2.037 
 0.503    0.877 0.387   0.262   1.295 
CRIME4  0.084  *** 0.092 *** 0.040 *** 0.025 ***  0.060  * 
 0.014    0.020 0.012   0.008   0.035 
REPORT -2.399  ***  -1.890 -0.649   -0.431   1.358 
 0.747    1.518 0.460   0.271   2.186 
Firm controls  YES   YES YES   YES   YES 
Bank fixed effects  YES   YES YES   YES   YES 
          
Adj. R-squared  0.128   0.013 0.226   0.108   0.068 
No. obs.  329827   195518 58338   60510   278844 
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Table 8 
Collateral and types of crime 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. In the OLS regressions the dependent variable is 
ratio of collateralized credit to total outstanding credit, referring to total loans (_TOTAL), short-
term (_SHORT TERM) and long-term loans (_LONG TERM). In the Logit models the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the bank-firm relationships are partly or fully collateralized, considering 
respectively total credit, short term and long term credit. In the logit models marginal effects are 
reported instead of coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the province level and are Huber-
White robust. 
 






 OLS  OLS  OLS 
 Coeff.    Coeff.    Coeff.   
CRIME1 0.029    0.002   0.051   
 0.019    0.009   0.063   
CRIME2 0.018    -0.033   -0.920   
 0.233    0.110   0.802   
CRIME3 2.139    3.328 ***  4.519   
 2.010    0.682   6.048   
CRIME4 0.104  **  0.046   0.685  *** 
 0.044    0.036   0.213   
REPORT -5.872  **  -2.869 **  -9.007   
 2.448    1.083   9.551   
Firm controls  YES  YES YES 
Bank fixed effects  YES  YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.218  0.037 0.271  
No. obs.  435561  390113 131893  
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Table 9 
Composition of loans and types of crime 
 
The data refer to a cross-section for the year 2000. The dependent variable is the actual share of 
firms’ total bank credit available in the form of loans secured by accounts receivable (SHARE_1), 
short-term loans (SHARE_2ST), term loans with a maturity of more than 18 months 
(SHARE_2LT) and revolving credit lines (SHARE_3). Standard errors are clustered at the 
province level and are Huber-White robust. 
 
DEP. VAR.:  SHARE_1  SHARE_2ST SHARE_2LT  SHARE3 
  Coeff.  Sign. Coeff.  Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff.  Sign. 
CRIME1  -0.017   -0.020   0.019   0.019  
  0.054   0.028   0.015   0.043  
CRIME2  -2.416 ***  0.543   0.533 ***  1.340 ** 
  0.726   0.341   0.188   0.574  
CRIME3  -24.074 ***  0.207   0.458   23.409 *** 
  5.422   2.334   1.939   3.845  
CRIME4  -0.275   0.052   -0.109 **  0.332 ** 
  0.228   0.075   0.046   0.162  
REPORT  1.630   9.132 ***  -2.097   -8.665  
  7.828   3.084   1.891   5.943  
      
Firm controls  YES  YES YES   YES 
Bank fixed effects  YES  YES YES   YES 
          
Adj. R-squared  0.259  0.123 0.364   0.216  
No. obs.  525872  525872 525872   525872  
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Table 10 
Proxies for access to credit 
 
The data refer to a cross-section of firms for the year 2000. ACCESS is equal to 1 if the firm is in 
the Central Credit Register (excluding non-performing positions) because of loan commitments or 
credit drawn above the register’s threshold. OVERDRAFT is equal to 1 if the firm has drawn more 
credit than its commitments. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients. Standard errors 
are clustered at the province level and are Huber-White robust.  
 
DEP. VAR.:  ACCESS  ACCESS  OVERDRAFT  OVERDRAFT 
 dy/dx  Sign.  dy/dx  Sign.  dy/dx  Sign.  dy/dx  Sign.
CRIME -0.004  *** -0.004 *** 0.001   0.002 **
 0.0006  0.0006 0.0007  0.0007
REPORT 0.429  *** 0.436 *** -0.116   -0.120
 0.147  0.148 0.126   0.125
SIZE2 0.376  *** 0.390 *** 0.119 ***  0.137 ***
 0.007  0.008 0.005   0.010
SIZE3 0.425  *** 0.441 *** 0.246 ***  0.269 ***
 0.007  0.192 0.006   0.014
SIZE4 0.363  *** 0.372 *** 0.342 ***  0.389 ***
 0.008  0.009 0.010   0.016
SIZE5 0.318  *** 0.315 *** 0.420 ***  0.467 ***
 0.008  0.008 0.012   0.017
CRIME*SIZE2 -  -0.001 *** -   -0.002 *
 -  0.0002 -   0.001
CRIME*SIZE3 -  -0.002 *** -   -0.003 **
 -  0.0004 -   0.001
CRIME*SIZE4 -  -0.002 *** -   -0.006 ***
 -  0.0005 -   0.002
CRIME*SIZE5 -  0.0004 -   -0.009 **
 -  0.0007 -   0.004
CORP 0.087  *** 0.088 *** 0.058 **  -0.308 ***
 0.018  0.017 0.024   0.099
LLIAB 0.068  *** 0.068 *** 0.046 **  -0.137
 0.020  0.020 0.023   0.094
COOP -0.063  *** -0.063 *** -0.030   0.051
 0.021  0.021 0.026   0.113
FPROFIT 0.001  0.001 0.001 **  -0.003 ***
 0.001  0.001 0.0005  0.0006
FTANG 0.043  *** 0.042 *** -0.024 *** -0.160 ***
 0.006  0.006 0.008   0.044
FAGE 0.029  *** 0.028 *** 0.003 ***  0.032 ***
 0.003  0.003 0.001  0.007
RATING 0.025  *** 0.025 *** 0.091 *** 0.067 ***
 0.001  0.001 0.002  0.005
HERFMKT 0.126  0.130 -0.143  0.080
 0.107  0.107 0.100  0.460
INEFF -0.020  *** -0.021 *** 0.012  0.013
 0.007  0.008 0.007  0.017
VAPC 0.015  *** 0.014 *** 0.001  -0.016 ***
 0.003  0.003 0.002   0.005
LOGBRANCH -0.018  -0.018 -0.039 **  0.092 ***
 0.013  0.013 0.016   0.027
    
Pr(Y=1)  0.689 0.689 0.421   0.421
Adj. R-squared  0.329  0.329 0.105   0.106
No. obs.  285332  285332 172606   172606
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